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Abstract
The current paper is the ﬁrst to report an experimental study of Min
and Max induced rankings, i.e. a family of set rankings that require
preferences over sets to be induced from comparison of the best and/or
worst elements within those sets. When pitted against the Uniform
Expected Utility criterion (UEU), the Min and Max induced rankings
perform particularly worse in predicting real-life decision makers' pref-
erences. The latter ﬁnding prompted us to investigate their axiomatic
underpinnings by means of pairwise choice experiments. From this in-
vestigation, some important conclusions can be drawn: Axioms that
prevent rankings to be based on total-goodness, as well as monotonic-
ity conditions (ensuring that replacing a set element with a better one
results in a better set) cannot be refuted. Axioms that rule out any
utilization of the relative diﬀerence in position of the elements and
axioms that prevent rankings to be based on average-goodness are all
systematically violated. The UEU criterion seems to meet the apparent
shortcomings of the Min and Max induced rankings. Some frequently
occurring preference patterns, however, suggest that a signiﬁcant por-
tion of the participants uses neither a Min or Max induced ranking, nor
UEU, but some other unspeciﬁed decision rule, possibly characterized
by the tendency to prefer a diversiﬁcation of uncertainty.
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Introduction
One can distinguish among diﬀerent models for decision making by the quan-
tity of information they require. In models for decision under risk, a unique and
objectively known probability distribution over the possible outcomes is available to
guide one's decision. In this respect, von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) formulated
the ﬁrst classical axiomatization of Expected Utility, the most widely known model
for choosing among objective probability distributions. Models for decision making
under uncertainty, on the other hand, assume that objective probabilities do not nec-
essarily exist. Savage (1956) argued that in such situations the decision maker acts
as if she assigns her own subjective probabilities to the states of nature associated
with the various possible outcomes. As demonstrated by the Ellsberg paradox, how-
ever, situations exist in which people do not act upon the usual probability rules.
Other theorists investigated the concept of complete uncertainty or ignorance, which
describes situations where the decision maker has no information about the proba-
bilities of the outcomes, nor about their likelihood ranking. Usually, the resulting
models follow the classical Savagian approach by deﬁning a decision or an action as
a mapping from the set of possible states of the world to the set of outcomes (e.g.,
Arrow & Hurwicz, 1972; Cohen & Jaﬀray, 1980; Maskin, 1979; Milnor, 1954; Luce &
Raiﬀa, 1957). Nonetheless, scenarios exist for which the idea of states of the world
is pointless because the decision maker does not have any notion at all of which par-
ticular state might lead to a given outcome, or because the number of possible states
of the world is extremely large. For these scenarios, the previously described families
of models are not adequate; they call for the development of models that associate
each decision directly with a set of possible outcomes. As such, the problem of rank-
ing decisions according to one's preferences will be reduced to the ranking of sets
of outcomes. Therefore, we will refer to these kinds of decisions as set rankings".
Models within this domain are surveyed by Barberà et al. (2004). All of these models
were axiomatically characterized, that is, axioms which take into account the deci-
sion maker's preferences over outcomes are imposed on the relation over the set of
nonempty subsets of the universal space of outcomes. These axioms typically refer to
reasonable attitudes towards uncertainty by the decision maker, as well as particular
consistency conditions. An important observation in the domain of set ranking is
that various combinations of plausible axioms imply that people rank sets by consid-
ering exclusively their best and worst elements. Indeed, in most rankings that have
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emerged in the literature, such as Maximin, Maximax, Minmax, Maxmin and their
lexicographic extensions, an essential role is granted to the maximum and minimum
of the sets to be compared. We will refer to these decision models as Min and Max
induced rankings.
For example, people who choose according to the Maximin decision rule, will
base their decision on comparison of the worst elements only. If the worst elements
of the sets to be compared are equal, the decision maker using Maximin will be
indiﬀerent. The Maximax rule entails a comparison of the best elements only.
Pattanaik & Peleg (1984) provided characterizations of Leximin and Leximax.
Like Maximin, the Leximin rule starts with comparing the worst elements or minima
when deciding between two sets. However, if both minima are equal, the decision
maker is not indiﬀerent but she will eliminate the worst elements from both sets and
compare the reduced sets by their minima. If once again these reduced sets have the
same minimum, the procedure will be repeated until a situation is reached in which
the reduced sets each have a diﬀerent minimum and a preference can be stated, or
until one set is exhausted before the other in which case the nonempty set will be
preferred. The Leximax rule, on the other hand, is the dual of the former in the
sense that it starts with comparing the maxima after which it successively eliminates
identical maxima. If by using Leximax, one set is eliminated completely while some
elements of the other remain, the empty set will be preferred. A decision maker
using either Leximin or Leximax will only be indiﬀerent between two sets if they are
completely identical.
The Minmax and Maxmin2 rules (Arlegi, 2003) treat the best and worst ele-
ments in a lexicographical fashion. According to Minmax, comparison of the minima
will be the primary criterion for ranking sets. In the case where the minima coin-
cide, a decision maker following Minmax will proceed to comparing the maxima. An
indiﬀerence will be stated when the minima as well as the maxima of both sets are
identical. The Maxmin rule is the dual case in which the decision maker ﬁrst consid-
ers the maxima in the sets to be compared, and when these are identical, she will go
on to comparing the minima.
Bossert et al. (2000) axiomatically characterized the Lexicographic Minmax rule
where the decision maker initially proceeds as under Minmax. However, instead of
2Note that the Maxmin rule is not the same as the Maximin rule described in one of the previous
paragraphs.
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immediately imposing indiﬀerence in case of a `tie', she will eliminate the best and
worst elements of both sets and apply the Minmax rule to the reduced sets. This
procedure will be repeated until a preference can be stated. Should one of the sets be
exhausted in this process of repeated elimination whereas the other is not, then the
nonempty set will be declared better than the empty set. The Lexicographic Maxmin
rule is deﬁned analogously.
As mentioned, all of these models were characterized by means of various plausi-
ble and intuitively appealing axioms which we will discuss later in this paper. Besides,
they can also be intuitively motivated as reﬂecting certain internal attitudes of the
decision maker vis-à-vis the choice problem, such as one's risk aversion, the extent to
which one is ready to iterate in the case of a tie, or the propensity to aim attention
at particular characteristics of the sets (Arlegi, 2001).
Moreover, justiﬁcation for these kinds of sequential processes in which only a
limited number of attributes is taken into account can be found in the literature
on bounded rationality, a concept introduced by Simon (Simon, 1955, 1956, 1990)
which accounts for the observation that perfectly rational decisions are often not
feasible in practice due to limitations in the computational resources available for
making them. Simon argues that people rather satisﬁce than optimize; as soon as
an alternative is found that meets one's aspiration level, the decision process is cut
short. The aforementioned Min and Max induced rankings, which imply that people
concentrate on certain focal features of a decision situation, being the worst or the
best outcome (or the second-worst or second best if the previous ones coincide), at the
risk of ignoring potentially relevant information, perfectly ﬁt the concept of bounded
rationality. Furthermore, Gigerenzer and colleagues argue that simple step-by-step
rules or heuristics can yield adaptive decisions in various situations (Gigerenzer &
Selten, 2001). Research has also shown that simple heuristics are often more accurate
in predicting actual decision behavior than models of optimal choice (Czerlinski et
al., 1999; Dawes, 1979; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999) and that they can even lead to
better decisions (e.g., DeMiguel et al., 2009)
It is interesting to point out that almost all of the rankings described in the
literature are element-induced (Arlegi, 2001), that is, preferences over sets are in-
duced from the comparison of certain elements within the respective sets. Element
induction, however, is not the only possible way of comparing and evaluating sets.
For instance, a utility function can be deﬁned over the universe of outcomes in addi-
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tion to which additive operations could be performed. An example of such a decision
rule is the Uniform Expected Utility criterion, which was characterized by Gravel
et al. (2007). This model closely resembles the classical Expected Utility criterion:
sets are ranked in accordance with the expected utility of their elements, but, since
no information about the probabilities is available, the decision maker acts as if all
outcomes within a set are equally probable.
So far, set rankings have only been adopted in some ﬁelds of economic
analysis and models are mainly intended to be normatively appealing and useful
in applied situations. The Min and Max induced rankings, for example, allow
for the construction of a set ranking based exclusively on the observation of the
preference relation over singletons. In our view, however, it would be interesting
to investigate whether these rankings can prove themselves valid in the descrip-
tive sense as well. So far we know of only one study that has adopted such a
descriptive approach (i.e., Vrijdags, 2010). In the current article, we will examine
the descriptive validity of the Min and Max induced rankings by two methods.
First, we will attempt to test their overall validity by presenting a series of choices
for which the Min induced rankings predict a diﬀerent choice pattern than the
Max induced rankings and by analyzing the number of participants showing each
pattern. Secondly, since it will be shown that neither of these models ﬁt the
data, the individual axioms characterizing them will be tested in order to obtain
a more detailed account of what goes wrong in particular. In the last section we
will attempt to give some structure to the abundance of data gathered by testing
every single axiom. The axioms will be grouped according to certain characteris-
tics and the obtained clues as to how to model observed set rankings will be discussed.
Experimental method
The data for this paper were gathered in two experiments, Experiment I and
Experiment II. For both experiments, participants were recruited by way of an
e-mail in which they were asked to complete an Internet questionnaire regarding
decision behavior. These questionnaires comprised a number of pairs of sets with
numbers, representing monetary amounts in EUR, as the set elements. For each of
these pairs the participants were asked to state their preference by clicking a radio
button besides the preferred set. In the instructions it was explained that each set
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could be conceived of as a lottery in the form of a container holding one hundred
tickets. On each of these tickets, one of the amounts in the set is printed. However,
the frequencies of each of the amounts in the container is unknown. For example, a
set {28, 17} can be thought of as a container holding an unknown number of tickets
with 28 printed on them as well as an unknown number of tickets with 17 printed
on them, both of which sum to one hundred. In order to play the lottery, one ticket
would be drawn at random from the container, and the amount on it would be the
prize to be won in euros. In this case, choosing a set comes down to choosing the
lottery one would rather play.
Choices appeared as in Figure 1
Figure 1. Choice representation for Experiment I and II. The sentence in Dutch literally
translates to Choose one of the following answers.
Each choice was presented twice with the position of the sets (ﬁrst or second row)
counterbalanced since, as explained in the next section, the proportion of preference
reversals between replications of the same choice is needed to estimate the error rate
for that choice.
In the ﬁrst replicate, the choices were presented a ﬁrst time. In the second repli-
cate, the whole series was repeated. Within each replication, the order of presentation
of the choices was randomized. It was repeatedly stressed in the instructions that the
proportions of the diﬀerent numbers in the containers, and thus the probabilities of
winning the respective monetary prizes, were unknown. Participants were also in-
formed that ten of them would be selected at random to play one of their chosen
lotteries for real money.
A total of 101 people participated in Experiment I, which comprised 55
experimental choices, presented twice. Most of them were students in the Faculty
of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University, 82% were female and
92% were between 18 and 25 years of age. Experiment II consisted of 33 choices,
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presented twice. A total of 131 students participated in Experiment II, 77% of which
were female, and 91% of which were 23 years of age, or younger.
In order to test whether certain observed preference patterns are real", rather
than produced by random error, the true and error model proposed by Birnbaum
(Birnbaum, 2004; Birnbaum & Bahra, 2007) was used. This model allows each person
to have a diﬀerent true pattern of preferences, and it allows each choice to have a
diﬀerent rate of error.
True and Error model
When choices are not too obvious to make, participants' responses to the same
pair of sets cannot be expected to be fully consistent across multiple presentations.
Since none of the representations in set ranking comes with a natural source of ran-
domness, we need to impose some probabilistic structure. Diﬀerent models of error
arose in the literature on this subject (e.g., Sopher & Gigliotti, 1993; Harless &
Camerer, 1994; Hey & Orme, 1994). In this paper the true and error model, pro-
posed by Birnbaum (2004) is applied. This error model resembles that of Sopher
& Gigliotti (1993), except that it uses repeated presentations of the same choices in
order to unambiguously estimate the error rate for each distinct choice.
The true and error model assumes that preferences are subject speciﬁc, i.e.,
each subject is allowed to have a diﬀerent true preference order. A subject's true
preference order will not change when he or she is repeatedly presented with the
same choice, but on any given trial there exists a possibility of making an error in
evaluating his or her true preference. Presumably, the more diﬃcult a choice is, the
higher the error rate will be for that choice.
For example, consider a choice between two sets, F and S. If this choice is
presented twice, there are four possible response patterns, FF if F is chosen both
times, FS if one switches from F to S , SF if one switches from S to F , and SS if
S is chosen both times. In this case, the observed pattern SS can come about in two
mutually exclusive ways: the subject truly prefers S and made two correct reports,
or the subject truly prefers F and made two errors. The theoretical probability that
a person would choose the second gamble on both replicates, P (SS), is then given by
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the following expression:
P (SS) = p(1− e)2 + (1− p)e2. (1)
where p represents the probability of truly preferring S to F , and e represents the
error rate for this choice.
Similarly, the probability of switching from F in the ﬁrst replicate to S in the
second replicate is given as follows:
P (FS) = pe(1− e) + (1− p)(1− e)e = e(1− e). (2)
This model implies that the probability of switching from F to S equals the probability
of switching from S to F . Therefore, the probability of either type of preference
reversal equals 2e(1− e).
The probability of choosing the ﬁrst gamble twice is given by:
P (FF ) = pe2 + (1− p)(1− e)2. (3)
The extension of this model to evaluate properties that comprise more than one choice
is explained in the next section.
Comparison of Min and Max induced rankings and UEU
We do not assume that all people use the same decision rule for stating a
preference between sets of outcomes. As pointed out, most rules that are standard
in the ﬁeld postulate that the decision maker starts by focussing on the elements
she considers as representative or focal in each set, and then compares the sets by
contrasting their respective focal elements.
People who are cautious or risk-averse, for example, might focus on the least
attractive outcomes, the minima. If these people, in deciding between two sets,
give absolute priority to the maximization of the minimum at the risk of ignoring
potentially relevant information, they might be using the Maximin, Leximin, Minmax
or Lexicographic Minmax rules or yet another rule that starts with comparing minimal
outcomes. We will assign to this group of element-induced rules the collective name
Min induced rankings. Other people might be more inclined to focus on the most
attractive outcomes, the maxima. If, for each choice, they start comparing sets by
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their maximal outcomes before anything else, their behavior accords with one of the
Max induced rankings, a term which we use to lump together all element-induced
rules that incorporate comparison of the maxima as a ﬁrst step, such as the Maximax,
Leximax, Maxmin and Lexicographic Maxmin rules. Still others might not be using
an element-induced rule at all, but judge or validate a set by some averaging operation,
like the Uniform Expected Utility criterion (UEU), instead of limiting the scope to
certain focal elements. In order to get a grasp of the distribution of these kinds of
decision behaviors we set up an experiment in which we administered, amongst other
choices, the series of three choices listed in Table 1.
Predictions
Each row in Table 1 represents a diﬀerent pair of sets for which the participants
were asked to state a preference. For example, predicted preference for the ﬁrst set
in choice 13 is indicated by F1 in Table 1, predicted preference for the second set is
indicated by S1, and so on. As can be seen in Table 1, the minima and maxima of
the sets to be compared never coincide. Under these circumstances, decision behavior
according to the element induced-rules described above will fall into two categories:
decisions based on the minimum if people follow one of the Min induced rankings,
and decisions based on the maximum if their decision strategy matches one of the
Max induced rules.
Table 1: Choice stimuli used for the examination of the predictive capacities of the Min and
Max induced rankings and UEU.
Choice Sets Rankings UEU
No. First (F) Second(S) Min Max
13 F1 = {6, 5} S1 = {7, 1} F1 S1 F1
25 F2 = {25, 20} S2 = {21} S2 F2 F2
3 F3 = {29, 3} S3 = {28, 27, 2} F3 F3 S3
The Min and Max induced rankings make diﬀerent predictions for Choices 13, 25, and 3,
administered in Experiment I. In the last three columns, Fi denotes a predicted preference
for the ﬁrst set; Si indicates a predicted preference for the second set.
The data pattern implied by the Min induced rankings will be indicated by
F1S2F3, which denotes the rankings F1  S1, S2  F2 and F3  S3 in choices
13, 25 and 3, respectively. According to these decision rules, participants should
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choose F1, S2 and F3 because all three of them have more favorable minima than
their counterparts. Similarly, the Max induced rankings imply pattern S1F2F3.
When the expected utilities are calculated for each set in the way prescribed by
UEU (where we assume for simplicity that u(x) = x for these rather small amounts3),
these are the highest for sets F1, F2 and S3 in choices 13, 25 and 3, respectively.
Thereby, the predictions of UEU agree with the Min induced rankings in choice 13
and with the Max induced rankings in choice 25. For choice 3, both Min and Max
induced rankings predict a preference for set F3. Yet, UEU prescribes that people
will choose set S3; despite the fact that its minimal as well as its maximal outcomes
are lower than those in set F3, it still has a higher expected utility.
Evidently, other decision strategies that imply pattern F1F2S3 can be thought
of besides UEU. Consider for example a rule according to which people compare the
ratio of `high' and `low' outcomes in each set in order to decide. In choice 13, for
example, 1 EUR can be considered a low outcome, while 5 EUR, 6 EUR and 7 EUR
can be regarded as higher ones. The ﬁrst set thus contains nothing but high outcomes,
whereas 50% of the elements in the second set is low, yielding a preference for the
ﬁrst set. The same rule would predict a preference for set F2 in choice 25 since it
contains one high and one low outcome as opposed to only one low outcome in set
S2, and set S3 would be preferred in choice 3, where two out of three outcomes are
high as opposed to one out of two in the ﬁrst set.
Results
We used the true and error model (Birnbaum, 2004) presented in the intro-
duction to estimate the error rates (e) and the true probability of preferring the
second set (p) for each choice. Table 2 displays the number of people who showed
each combination of stated preferences for the two presentations of each choice.
The parameters, p and e, were estimated by minimizing the χ2(1) between the
observed frequencies and those predicted by the true and error model. The estimated
parameters and corresponding χ2(1)'s are presented in the last three columns of
Table 2. The true and error model appears to give a reasonable approximation to
the data; indeed, none of the χ2(1)'s are signiﬁcant (α = .05).
3u(x) = x is just one possible utility function for which these predictions hold. If the utility
function were of the form u(x) = xβ , the predictions are correct for all β's within the interval
]0, 2.95].
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Table 2: Replication data used to estimate p = probability of true preference for the second
set, and e = error rate for each choice (n = 101).
Choice Sets Replication Patterns
No. First (F) Second (S) FF FS SF SS
pˆ eˆ χ2(1)
13 F1 = {6, 5} S1 = {7, 1} 90 4 4 3 0.031 0.041 0.00
25 F2 = {25, 20} S2 = {21} 78 13 5 5 0.047 0.107 3.42
3 F3 = {29, 3} S3 = {28, 27, 2} 12 12 17 60 0.865 0.176 0.86
Entries under FF , FS, SF , and SS are the observed numbers of people who showed each
combination of choices for the two replicates of each choice. For example, 90 participants
out of 101 chose the ﬁrst set (F1) in both presentations of Choice 13 (ﬁrst row of the table).
Contrary to the predictions of the Max induced rankings, merely three percent
of all participants is estimated to have a true preference for set S1 in choice 13.
For this choice, the majority thus seems to comply with the predictions of the Min
induced rankings and UEU. A diﬀerent phenomenon occurs in choice 25 where the
results contradict the Min induced rankings. In choice 3, the modal response only
agrees with UEU. In spite of its lower minimum and maximum, the estimated rate of
true preference for the second set, S3, is 86.5%.
Unlike the Min and Max induced rankings, which fail to predict the modal
response in two out of three choices, UEU correctly predicts all three modal choices.
The frequencies of each response pattern for the complete sequence of three
choices have been tabulated in Table 3. Since the three choices were presented twice,
there are 26 = 64 possible response patterns in total. Many of these 64 patterns have
null frequencies, therefore, the data were pooled into 16 cells as follows. For each
of the eight preference patterns in Table 3, the number of times it was shown on
both replicates was counted as well as the number of times it was shown on either
the ﬁrst or the second replicate, but not both, divided by two. For example, in the
ﬁrst row of Table 3 it is shown that 16 out of 101 participants demonstrated pattern
F1F2F3 on the ﬁrst replicate, and 18 did so on the second replicate. Out of these,
six people showed pattern F1F2F3 on both replicates. The number of times F1F2F3
was shown on either the ﬁrst or the second replication, but not both is then given by
(16 − 6) + (18 − 6) = 22. In order to avoid that responses with a diﬀerent pattern
in the ﬁrst and second replicate are counted twice (once for the pattern in the ﬁrst
replicate and once for the pattern in the second replicate), this number is divided by
12
two, which yields 11. Grouping the 64 frequencies of the complete patterns over the
two replicates in the way described above yields the 16 mutually exclusive frequencies
in the fourth and ﬁfth column of Table 3. From these 16 frequencies, which sum to
the total number of participants, there are three error probabilities and eight true
probabilities to be estimated.
Table 3: Observed frequencies and estimated true probabilities for each of the 8 possible
response patterns for Choices 13, 25, and 3 in Experiment I.
Response Observed frequencies Estimated true
pattern Rep 1 Rep 2 Both One not both probability
F1F2F3 16 18 6 11 0.079
F1F2S3 68 58 44 19 0.821
F1S2F3 4 7 2 3.5 0.038
F1S2S3 6 11 1 7.5 0.005
S1F2F3 4 4 1 3 0.023
S1F2S3 3 3 2 1 0.035
S1S2F3 0 0 0 0 0.000
S1S2S3 0 0 0 0 0.000
Total 101 101 56 45 1
Entries under  Rep 1, Rep 2 and Both represent the number of participants who
showed each pattern for the ﬁrst presentation of these three choices (the ﬁrst replicate),
the second presentation (the second replicate), and both presentations, respectively. The
column labeled One not both contains the number of people who showed that pattern on
one of the two replicates but not both divided by two. Estimated error rates are 0.041,
0.107, and 0.176 for Choices 13, 25, and 3, respectively. Evaluation of the true and error
model yields χ2(5) = 4.52, an acceptable ﬁt (α = .05).
The true and error model can straightforwardly be extended to estimate the
proportion of individuals with a given true preference pattern for the sequence of
three choices (Birnbaum & Gutierrez, 2007; Birnbaum & Bahra, 2007; Birnbaum &
Schmidt, 2008, 2010).
For example, suppose that a person shows the pattern predicted by UEU, i.e.,
F1F2S3, on both replicates. There are eight diﬀerent ways in which this pattern can
occur, each of them corresponding to one of the eight possible true preference patterns.
For instance, the conditional probability that someone demonstrates F1F2S3 on both
replicates, given that the person's true pattern is F1F2F3 is as follows:
P (“F1F2S3, F1F2S3|F1F2F3) = (1− e1)(1− e2)e3(1− e1)(1− e2)e3.
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The observed preference pattern is indicated with quotations marks, as opposed
to a true pattern without quotation marks. Furthermore, e1, e2 and e3 denote the
error probabilities in the three respective choices. In this particular case, the decision
maker stated her preferences correctly in each replicate of the ﬁrst two choices, choices
13 and 25, but made an error on both replicates of the third choice.
The joint probability of displaying response pattern “F1F2S3, F1F2S3 and at
the same time having the true pattern F1F2F3 (making the same mistake in both
replicates) is given by
P (“F1F2S3, F1F2S3 ∩ F1F2F3) = p(F1F2F3)(1− e1)(1− e2)e3(1− e1)(1− e2)e3.
where p(F1F2F3) is the theoretical probability that someone's true pattern is F1F2F3.
The overall probability of a person demonstrating response pattern F1F2S3 in both
replicates, P (“F1F2S3, F1F2S3), is the sum of eight terms like the above, one for each
of the eight true patterns.
P (“F1F2S3, F1F2S3) = p(F1F2F3)(1− e1)2(1− e2)2(1− e3)2 +
p(F1F2S3)(1− e1)2(1− e2)2e23 + p(F1S2F3)(1− e1)2e22(1− e3)2 +
p(F1S2S3)(1− e1)2e22e23 + p(S1F2F3)e21(1− e2)2(1− e3)2 +
p(S1F2S3)e
2
1(1− e2)2e23 + p(S1S2F3)e21e22(1− e3)2 +
p(S1S2S3)e
2
1e
2
2e
2
3.
Similarly, the overall probability of showing F1F2S3 in one replicate (the ﬁrst or the
second), irrespective of the response on the other replicate is given by:
P (“F1F2S3) = p(F1F2F3)(1− e1)(1− e2)(1− e3) + p(F1F2S3)(1− e1)(1− e2)e3 +
p(F1S2F3)(1− e1)e2(1− e3) + p(F1S2S3)(1− e1)e2e3 +
p(S1F2F3)e1(1− e2)(1− e3) + p(S1F2S3)e1(1− e2)e3 +
p(S1S2F3)e1e2(1− e3) + p(S1S2S3)e1e2e3.
Using elementary algebra and probability theory, it can be shown that the
average probability of showing pattern F1F2S3 on one replicate or the other, but not
both is obtained with:
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P (“F1F2S3)− P (“F1F2S3, F1F2S3).
The extended true and error model was ﬁt to the 16 frequencies in Table 3.
Error estimates obtained from the replication data in the previous analysis were
used. From these 16 frequencies that have 15 degrees of freedom (they sum to the
total number of participants), there are three error terms and eight true probabilities
to be estimated. Since the probabilities of the eight possible patterns sum to one, this
leaves 15 − 3 − 7 = 5 degrees of freedom to test the ﬁt of the true and error model.
The column labeled estimated true probability in Table 3 shows the estimated
true probabilities of each pattern, which were estimated to minimize the χ2 between
observed and predicted frequencies. For this analysis, χ2(5) equals 4.52, which is
not signiﬁcant (with α = 0.05), suggesting that the general true and error model
can be retained. With this model, 82.1% of all participants are estimated to have
F1F2S3 (p(F1F2S3) = 0.821), the pattern predicted by UEU, as their true pattern.
The patterns predicted by the Min induced rankings and the Max induced rankings
were both very rare: p(F1S2F3) =3.8% and p(S1F2F3) =2.3%, respectively.
Discussion
With the aim of providing an indication as to what extent real life decision
makers actually make decisions in accordance with the element-induced decision rules
described in the introduction, we devised a sequence of three choices for which Min
induced rankings, Max induced rankings and UEU each predict a diﬀerent choice
pattern.
The results provide a strong refutation of the Min and Max induced rules since
only a very small percentage of people seems to base their decisions on minimal or
maximal outcomes only, ignoring other relevant information. In this study, UEU per-
forms much better, the pattern predicted by UEU was followed by the great majority
of participants. Of course, UEU is not the only possible decision rule that can account
for these results.
The results do not reveal which speciﬁc decision rule(s) is (are) used by the vast
proportion of participants who showed pattern F1F2S3, but they do demonstrate,
however, that it is not a Min or Max induced ranking.
As pointed out in the introduction, each of these rankings has been characterized
by means of axioms imposed on the preference relation between sets. It has been
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clearly demonstrated that the Min and Max induced rankings fail to ﬁt the data,
which indicates that at least some of these axioms are not satisﬁed by the participants.
In the next sections we will explore exactly which axioms are systematically violated
and which appear to be valid4. Knowledge thereof might be useful if one aims to
design a decision model which is able to accommodate actual choice behavior. In
order to construct empirical tests for the axioms, we attempted, where possible, to
devise our choice stimuli in such a way that we believe they are most likely to yield
violations. In most cases this was done by assuming that real-life decision makers
perform some averaging operation over the outcomes in each set.
Axiom tests
Prior to continuing, some notation should be clariﬁed. An ordering is a
reﬂexive, transitive and complete binary relation, and a linear ordering is an
antisymmetric ordering. A linear preference ordering is a linear ordering with the
interpretation at least as good as. Let X be a nonempty and ﬁnite universal
set of outcomes. The set of all nonempty ﬁnite subsets of X is denoted by X.
Elements of X are interpreted as sets of possible outcomes under uncertainty, where
the decision maker does not know any probability distribution, nor any likelihood
ranking of the possible outcomes. Let R denote a linear preference ordering over
X. The asymmetric factor of R is denoted by P . Let % be an ordering over X. The
interpretation of % is such that A % B if and only if the set of possible outcomes
A ∈ X is considered at least as good as the set of possible outcomes B ∈ X by the
decision maker. Furthermore,  denotes the asymmetric factor of %.
Leximin & Leximax
Axioms and Stimuli. In this section, we will explain in detail the axioms char-
acterizing Leximin and Leximax as formulated by Pattanaik & Peleg (1984) as well
as the stimuli used to test them. It should be noted that every axiom in this paper
was tested by means of more than one (combination of) choice(s). In order to avoid
4Although Maximin and Maximax are widely mentioned as basic decision rules for ranking sets
of outcomes, we did, however, not ﬁnd an explicit axiomatization in the context of set ranking. As a
consequence, we will not provide any detailed empirical analysis of these decision rules. Nonetheless,
it is suspected that the axioms needed for the characterization of Maximin and Maximax will not
diﬀer substantially from the axioms tested in the next sections.
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needlessly complicating this paper, only one test for each axiom will be reported,
namely the test for which the most violations were observed5.
Dominance: For all A ∈ X, for all x ∈ X,
1. [xPy for all y ∈ A]⇒ A ∪ {x}  A;
2. [yPx for all y ∈ A]⇒ A  A ∪ {x};
Dominance requires that adding an element which is better (worse) than all
elements in a given set A produces a set that is better (worse) than the original set.
Given the interpretation of %, Dominance is often considered a basic requirement
for the ranking of sets of possible outcomes.
As shown in Table 4, this axiom was tested in Experiment I, with choices 31
and 32. In choice 31, the second set contains the same outcomes as the ﬁrst set
plus one additional outcome, 13 EUR, which is worse than every outcome in F1,
resulting in set S1 = {28, 17, 13} which, in the case where Dominance holds, should
be considered less attractive than set F1 = {28, 17}. Similarly, people should also
prefer F2 = {37, 28, 17} to S1 = {28, 17} according to Dominance.
Neutrality: For all A,B ∈ X, for all one-to-one mappings ϕ : A ∪B → X,
([xRy ⇔ ϕ(x)Rϕ(y) and yRx⇔ ϕ(y)Rϕ(x)] for all x ∈ A, for all y ∈ B)
⇒ (A % B ⇔ ϕ(A) % ϕ(B) and B % A⇔ ϕ(B) % ϕ(A)).
Neutrality implies that the relation R is not aﬀected by changes in two sets
A and B that preserve the relative rankings of all elements in A ∪ B. This rules
out any utilization of the relative diﬀerences in position of the outcomes. Consider
choices 1 and 15 in Table 4 and suppose that a decision maker prefers F1 = {15, 10}
to S1 = {11}. In this case, Neutrality requires that she prefers F2 = {25, 15} to
S2 = {24} as well, since the mapping from F1 and S1 to F2 and S2 does not change
the relative rankings of the elements in both sets.
Bottom Independence: For all A,B ∈ X, for all x ∈ X such that yPx for all
y ∈ A ∪B,
5An exhaustive listing of all the data gathered in Experiment I and II can be found in Table 15.
17
Table 4: Stimuli used to empirically validate the axioms characterizing Leximin and Leximax
(Pattanaik & Peleg, 1984).
Axiom Set
tested
Choice Experiment
First (F ) Second(S)
31∗ II F1 = {28, 17} S1 = {28, 17, 13}Dominance
32 II F2 = {37, 28, 17} S2 = {28, 17}
1∗ II F1 = {15, 10} S1 = {11}Neutrality
15 II F2 = {25, 15} S2 = {24}
19 I F1 = {20} S1 = {20, 18}Bottom Ind
20∗ I F2 = {20, 1} S2 = {20, 18, 1}
21 I F1 = {4, 3} S1 = {3}Top Ind
22 I F2 = {35, 4, 3} S2 = {35, 3}
29∗ I F1 = {100} S1 = {95, 90}Disjoint Ind
30 I F2 = {100, 10} S2 = {90, 95, 10}
∗ Choices marked with an asterisk were presented with set S in the ﬁrst position, and set
F in the second position when presented for the ﬁrst time. These positions were reversed in
the second replicate. Unmarked choices were arranged in the opposite fashion.
A  B ⇒ A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}.
Top Independence: For all A,B ∈ X, for all x ∈ X such that xPy for all y ∈ A∪B,
A  B ⇒ A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}.
Disjoint Independence: For all A,B ∈ X such that A ∩B = ∅,
for all x ∈ X\(A ∪B),
A  B ⇒ A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}.
Bottom Independence requires that if there exists a strict preference between to
sets A and B, adding the same element to both sets, an element which is worse than
any of the outcomes in either of the two original sets, should lead to a relative ranking
of the resulting sets which is the same as that of the originals. Top Independence is
its dual, where the added element is better than all of those present in the original
sets. Disjoint Independence applies to situations where A and B are disjoint. Here,
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the element to be added simply needs to be outside both original sets.
Choices 19 and 20 in Table 4 were used to test Bottom Independence. In choice
19, one is sure of receiving 20 EUR if set F1 = {20} is chosen. In set S1 = {20, 18},
on the other hand, there is a certain, unknown probability of ending up with only 18
EUR. In this case, we would expect most people to choose set F1, since there is no
apparent reason to do otherwise, except if the decision is based on maximal outcomes
only, in which case one would be indiﬀerent between both sets. In choice 20, the
original sets are enlarged with the same outcome, 1 EUR, which is considerably lower
than all other outcomes. If most people prefer the ﬁrst set in choice 19, then, according
to Bottom Independence, they should also do so in choice 20. However, in choice 20,
the average over the three outcomes in set S2 is higher than the average over the two
outcomes in set F2. People who evaluate sets by performing some averaging operation
over the outcomes might prefer the ﬁrst set in choice 19, and the second set in choice
20, and would thereby be violating Bottom Independence. The next two choices
in Table 4, were used to test Top Independence. These choices were constructed
following the reverse recipe as for Bottom Independence. First, participants are asked
to choose between a binary set, F1 = {4, 3}, and a singleton, S1 = {3}. Here, both sets
have the same minimum, while in the test for Bottom Independence, the sets in the
ﬁrst pair share their maximum. In choice 22, a considerably higher outcome, 35 EUR,
is added to the original sets, which again results in an evident inequality between the
ﬁrst and the second set in terms of the averages over the outcomes. Consequently,
people who consider the average over the elements in each set might demonstrate
pattern F1S2, i.e., they state preferences F1  S1 and S2  F2, a violation of Top
Independence. Our test for Disjoint Independence consists of Choices 29 and 306.
Sets in Choice 29 do not have any outcomes in common. Here, everyone should
prefer F1 = {100}, because its certain outcome is higher than any of the outcomes
S1 = {95, 90}. In Choice 30, the same lower consequence was added to both original
sets. Even though in this last choice, the maximum is still higher in set F2 = {100, 10}
than in set S2 = {95, 90, 10}, the average over the outcomes is higher in the latter.
People who choose F1 in choice 29 and S2 in choice 30 would be violating Disjoint
Independence.
6The same set of stimuli could also be used to test Bottom Independence, but as rate of violations
was higher for choices 19 and 20, both tests were reported.
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Results. The number of people demonstrating each preference pattern for the
two presentations of the eight experimental choices is reported in Table 5. From these
data, the rates of error and the true probabilities of preferring the second set were
estimated for each choice.
Table 5: Replication data used to estimate the true probability and error rate for each
choice.
Choice Set Replication Patterns
(Exp.) First (F) Second(S) FF FS SF SS
pˆ eˆ χ2(1)
Dominance
31(II) F1 = {28, 17} S1 = {28, 17, 13} 111 11 6 3 0.020 0.073 1.44
32(II) F2 = {37, 28, 17} S2 = {28, 17} 125 1 4 1 0.007 0.023 1.67
Neutrality
1(II) F1 = {15, 10} S1 = {11} 111 12 6 2 0.011 0.078 1.95
15(II) F2 = {25, 15} S2 = {24} 7 7 11 106 0.944 0.076 0.88
Bottom Independence
19(I) F1 = {20} S1 = {20, 18} 85 8 6 2 0.017 0.076 0.28
20(I) F2 = {20, 1} S2 = {20, 18, 1} 1 2 4 94 0.991 0.032 0.65
Top Independence
21(I) F1 = {4, 3} S1 = {3} 99 1 1 0 0.000 0.010 0.01
22(I) F2 = {35, 4, 3} S2 = {35, 3} 31 14 21 35 0.536 0.227 1.39
Disjoint Independence
29(I) F1 = {100} S1 = {95, 90} 94 3 4 0 0.000 0.036 0.27
30(I) F2 = {100, 10} S2 = {90, 95, 10} 6 4 8 83 0.937 0.067 1.30
Entries under FF , FS, SF , and SS are the observed frequencies for each combination of
choices on the two replicates. The χ2(1)'s in the right-most column evaluate the ﬁt of the
true and error model. All are acceptable (α = .05).
The ﬁrst row in the table shows that 111 out of the 131 participants in
Experiment II chose set F1 on both presentations of choice 31, and only 3 chose S1
both times. For this choice, merely 2% of the participants are estimated to have
a true preference for the second set, and the estimated error rate on this choice is
7.3%. For the majority of people, i.e., 98%, choices thus comply with the Dominance
axiom. The same holds for choice 32 where 99.3% is estimated to have a true
preference for set F2, thereby satisfying Dominance. According to Neutrality, people
should choose either the ﬁrst or the second set on both choices 1 and 15. Instead,
the results show that 98.9% truly preferred F1 in choice 1, while only 5% chose F2
in choice 15. The modal choices of the participants in Experiment I also violate
Top Independence, Bottom Independence and Disjoint Independence, since most
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people chose set F1 on the ﬁrst choice of each respective test, and set S2 on the
second. The last column of Table 5 contains the chi-square tests of the true and error
model; none is signiﬁcant (α = 0.05), indicating that this error model can be accepted.
Table 6: Estimated true probabilities of each response pattern in the tests of Dominance,
Neutrality, and the three independence axioms.
Choice Set Parameter Estimates
(Exp) First (F ) Second (S) eˆ pˆ(F1F2) pˆ(F1S2) pˆ(S1F2) pˆ(S1S2)
χ2(2)
Dominance
31(II) F1 = {28, 17} S1 = {28, 17, 13} 0.073 0.970 0.008 0.021 0.000 0.51
32(II) F2 = {37, 28, 17} S2 = {28, 17} 0.023
Neutrality
1(II) F1 = {15, 10} S1 = {11} 0.078 0.064 0.922 0.000 0.014 0.83
15(II) F2 = {25, 15} S2 = {24} 0.076
Bottom Independence
19(I) F1 = {20} S1 = {20, 18} 0.076 0.012 0.982 0.000 0.006 0.23
20(I) F2 = {20, 1} S2 = {20, 18, 1} 0.032
Top Independence
21(I) F1 = {4, 3} S1 = {3} 0.010 0.476 0.524 0.000 0.000 0.99
22(I) F2 = {35, 4, 3} S2 = {35, 3} 0.227
Disjoint Independence
29(I) F1 = {100} S1 = {95, 90} 0.036 0.057 0.943 0.000 0.000 0.24
30(I) F2 = {100, 10} S2 = {90, 95, 10} 0.067
Tests of the true and error model are shown in the last column. All ﬁve of them show
acceptable ﬁts (α = .05). Entries in bold are the probabilities of the true patterns that
comply with the axiom on that line.
Table 6 shows the results of the true and error model, extended to combinations
of two choices7. For each axiom test, this model assumes that a participant's true
preferences correspond to one of the four possible patterns: F1F2, F1S2, S1F2, and
S1S2.
According to Dominance, people should demonstrate pattern F1F2. The ﬁrst
row in Table 6 shows that the estimated probability of having F1F2 as true preference
pattern in the test for Dominance equals 97%. In this test, almost everybody's choices
agree with Dominance.
If Neutrality holds, people should show either F1F2 or S1S2. Instead, it is
estimated that 92.2% of participants truly switch from F1 in Choice 1 to S2 in Choice
7After extending the true and error model to a model capable of analyzing patterns consisting
of three choices, adaptation for the analysis of patterns consisting of two choices is self-explanatory
(e.g., Birnbaum, 2008).
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15, hereby violating Neutrality.
The bottom part of Table 6 displays the tests for Bottom Independence, Top
Independence and Disjoint Independence. Patterns where preferences are reversed,
i.e., S1F2 and F1S2, are incompatible with the independence axioms, patterns S1S2
and F1F2 agree with the axioms. In all three tests, most people are estimated to
violate the axioms. In none of the rows did the sum of pˆ(F1F2) and pˆ(S1S2) reach
a majority. In the test for Bottom Independence (choices 19 and 20), 98.2% are
estimated to have F1S2 as their true preference pattern, while true preferences are
estimated to comply with Bottom Independence for only 1.8% (pˆ(F1F2) + pˆ(S1S2)).
The rates of violations of Top Independence and Disjoint Independence are 52.4% and
94.3%, respectively. Surprisingly, even though the choice stimuli were constructed
using the samealbeit reversedrecipe, the violation rate is much lower for Top
Independence than for Bottom Independence. In fact, although almost everybody
chose S2 = {20, 18, 1} instead of F2 = {20, 1} in the test of Bottom Independence, also
46.4% truly preferred F2 = {35, 4, 3} over S2 = {35, 3} in the test of Top Independence
(see Table 5). The latter preference statement does not match the assumption implied
by models like UEU, according to which these stimuli were designed, i.e., that people
rank sets according to the average over the values of the outcomes.
Discussion. The only axiom of Pattanaik and Peleg's (1984) axiomatization of
the Leximin and Leximax rules that could not be refuted empirically is Dominance,
which is considered an extremely plausible requirement, given the interpretation of
%.
Our test of Neutrality demonstrated that most participants changed their pref-
erences as the relative values of the outcomes in the sets to be compared changed,
even though the comparative order of those outcomes over both sets remained the
same. This ﬁnding entails that relative diﬀerences between outcomes appear to play
a role in choosing between sets of monetary consequences.
We were able to bring about substantial violation rates for all three indepen-
dence axioms. Presumably, these violations occurred because the choice stimuli were
constructed in such a way that the addition of a common element resulted in a re-
versal of the ranking of the set averages. Particularly for those people who actually
evaluate sets by their average, such stimuli should give rise to preference statements
that disagree with the independence axioms. Surprisingly, we found the violations to
be substantially lower in number for Top Independence as compared to Bottom In-
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dependence and Disjoint Independence. Apparently, people are more likely to choose
the set with the higher average if this is also the set with the highest cardinality,
than when the set with the highest average has the least number of elements. This
observation contradicts decision models like UEU, and is reminiscent of the Richness
Appeal axiom8, proposed by Arlegi (2007) as an attitude towards uncertainty in the
context of sequentially consistent rankings. Preferences complying with Richness Ap-
peal might be indicative of a positive attitude towards a diversiﬁcation uncertainty
within the range of the minimum and maximum of a set; the decision maker prefers
one more possible outcome instead of being constrained to the two extremes, even
when the value of this middle outcome is very close to the minimum, resulting in a
lower set average.
Minmax & Maxmin
Axioms and Stimuli. Arlegi (2003) postulated six axioms for the characteriza-
tion of Minmax and Maxmin, each of which is described in more detail below.
Simple Uncertainty Aversion: For all x, y, z ∈ X,
xPyPz ⇒ {y}  {x, z}.
Simple Uncertainty Appeal: For all x, y, z ∈ X
xPyPz ⇒ {x, z}  {y}.
Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal are contrasting
empirical assumptions regarding the decision maker's attitude towards uncertainty
when comparing singletons and binary sets. Simple Uncertainty Aversion establishes
that receiving an outcome y with certainty is always preferred to an uncertain prospect
where either outcome x which is better than y or z which is worse than y may
materialize.
Simple Uncertainty Appeal reﬂects the dual attitude. This axiom prescribes
that the possibility of receiving an outcome which is better than y, despite the fact
8Richness Appeal : For all x, y, z ∈ X, xPyPz ⇒ {x, y, z}  {x, z}.
Richness Appeal stipulates that any set of three outcomes is always considered better than the
binary set consisting of its minimum and maximum.
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that it is linked with the possibility of receiving an outcome worse than y, is always
considered more attractive than receiving y with certainty.
Choices 15 and 16 in Table 7 were devised to test Simple Uncertainty Aversion
and Simple Uncertainty Appeal. Like Neutrality, these axioms assume that only or-
dinal information about the outcomes is taken into account by the decision maker.
Consequently, if % represents uncertainty aversion, the certain option should be pre-
ferred in both choices, regardless of the fact that the certain outcome is much closer
to the worst outcome of the uncertain prospect {25, 15} in Choice 16, i.e., S2 = {16},
than in Choice 15, i.e., S1 = {24}. Similarly, if % represents uncertainty appeal, the
uncertain option, {25, 15}, should be preferred in both choices. If the relative diﬀer-
ences in the positions of the objects do appear to matter (as was demonstrated in
the test for Neutrality in the preceding section), it is not unthinkable that the certain
outcome is chosen in the ﬁrst pair of sets, and the uncertain prospect in the second
pair.
Table 7: Stimuli used to empirically validate the axioms characterizing Minmax and Maxmin
(Arlegi, 2003).
Axiom Set
tested
Choice Experiment
First (F ) Second(S)
15 II F1 = {25, 15} S1 = {24}Simple Uncertainty Aversion/Appeal
16 II F2 = {25, 15} S2 = {16}
Simple Top Monotonicity 45∗ I F1 = {29, 3} S1 = {27, 3}
Simple Bottom Monotonicity 38 I F1 = {20, 2} S1 = {20, 1}
38 I F1 = {20, 2} S1 = {20, 1}Monotone Consistency
39 I F2 = {20, 2, 1} S2 = {20, 1}
47∗ I F1 = {59, 5, 1} S1 = {56, 5, 1}
Robustness 48 I F2 = {59, 5, 1} S2 = {55, 5, 1}
49∗ I F3 = {59, 5, 1} S3 = {56, 55, 5, 1}
∗ Choices marked with an asterisk were presented with set S in the ﬁrst position, and set
F in the second position in the ﬁrst replicate. In the second replicate, these positions were
reversed. Unmarked choices were arranged in the opposite fashion.
Simple Top Monotonicity For all x, y, z ∈ X
xPyPz ⇒ {x, z}  {y, z}.
Simple Bottom Monotonicity For all x, y, z ∈ X
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xPyPz ⇒ {x, y}  {x, z}.
Given a singleton {z} and two outcomes x and y, both of which are strictly
better than z, Simple Top Monotonicity implies that {z} enlarged with the better of x
and y will be strictly preferred to {z} enlarged with the worse of those two outcomes.
Simple Bottom Monotonicity is its dual, and applies to enlarging a singleton with
worse outcomes. These axioms can be regarded as rationality conditions for choice
under complete uncertainty (Bossert et al., 2000), and were assessed with Choices 45
and 38 in Table 7.
Monotone Consistency : For all A,B ∈ X,
A % B ⇒ A ∪B % B.
Monotone Consistency requires that if a set A is at least as good as another set
B, then B cannot be strictly better than the union of both A and B. Indeed, the
union of A and B contains the same outcomes as B, plus those in A, which made the
decision maker evaluate A as better than B. However, if one allows A and B to have
at least one `high' outcome in common, it is possible to establish a reversal of the
ranking of the set averages from the ﬁrst to the second choice, which might cause the
decision maker to violate Monotone Consistency. This can be illustrated with Choices
38 and 39 in Table 7. In Choice 38, sets F1 = {20, 2} and S1 = {20, 1} diﬀer only in
their minima. Consequently, as is also predicted by Simple Bottom Monotonicity, we
expect people to choose F1, the set with the most favorable minimum. If we compare
the union of F1 and S1, i.e., F2 = {20, 2, 1}, with S2 = {20, 1}, the minima and
maxima are equal in both sets, but F2 has one more low outcome. The average over
the outcomes is now more favorable in the second set. People who choose set F1 in
Choice 38 and set S2 in Choice 39 would be violating Monotone Consistency.
Robustness: For all A,B,C ∈ X,
A % B and A % C ⇒ A % B ∪ C.
Robustness ensures that if A is weakly better than both B and C, then A is weakly
better than the union of B and C.
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Choices 47, 48 and 49 in Table 7 constitute a test for Robustness. By allowing
the ﬁrst and second set to share their lowest outcomes, we were again able to produce
a reversal in the ranking of the set averages from the ﬁrst two choices to Choice
49, which might lead some subjects to exhibit response pattern F1F2S3 for the three
choices, a violation of Robustness.
Table 8: Replication data used to estimate true probability and error rate for each choice.
Choice Set Replication Patterns
(Exp.) First (F) Second(S) FF FS SF SS
pˆ eˆ χ2(1)
Simple Uncertainty Aversion/Appeal
15(II) F1 = {25, 15} S1 = {24} 106 11 7 7 0.944 0.076 0.88
16(II) F2 = {25, 15} S2 = {16} 117 7 2 5 0.039 0.041 2.60
Simple Top Monotonicity
45(I) F1 = {29, 3} S1 = {27, 3} 100 1 0 0 0.000 0.007 0.84
Simple Bottom Monotonicity
38(I) F1 = {20, 2} S1 = {20, 1} 101 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.00
Monotone Consistency
38(I) F1 = {20, 2} S1 = {20, 1} 101 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.00
39(I) F2 = {20, 2, 1} S2 = {20, 1} 31 7 13 50 0.621 0.116 1.77
Robustness
47(I) F1 = {59, 5, 1} S1 = {56, 5, 1} 101 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.00
48(I) F2 = {59, 5, 1} S2 = {55, 5, 1} 100 0 1 0 0.000 0.007 0.84
49(I) F1 = {59, 5, 1} S3 = {56, 55, 5, 1} 4 5 9 83 0.960 0.079 1.12
Entries under FF , FS, SF , and SS show the observed frequencies of each combination of
choices on the two replications. The χ2(1)'s in the last column assess the ﬁt of the true and
error model. All are acceptable ﬁts (α = .05).
Results. The true and error model was applied to estimate the proportion of
participants who truly preferred the second set in each choice. The results are shown
in Table 8. The estimates indicate that 94.4% of all participants truly preferred
singleton S2 in choice 15, whereas only 3.9% chose the singleton in choice 16. These
results entail a systematic violation of both Simple Uncertainty Appeal and Simple
Uncertainty Aversion.
The next two rows in Table 8 show that for Simple Top Monotonicity as well
as Simple Bottom Monotonicity, everyone is estimated to choose accordingly. In fact,
even the observed frequencies comply almost perfectly with the axioms; only one out
of 101 participants showed pattern F1S1 on the two presentations of Choice 45, all
others choose F1F1 in both axiom tests.
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Considering the estimated choice probabilities for choices 38 and 39, we can see
that everybody chose set F1 in the ﬁrst choice and 62% were estimated to truly prefer
set S2 in the second choice. This means that 62% of all participants truly violated
Monotone Consistency, since, according to this axiom, people who prefer F1 to S1,
should also prefer the union of F2 to S2.
In the last three rows in Table 8 it is shown that all of the participants truly
preferred the ﬁrst set in the ﬁrst two choices of the test for Robustness. Finally, 96%
are estimated to prefer the S3 in Choice 49, thereby violating Robustness.
Discussion. It has been shown that the Minmax and Maxmin rules, both mem-
bers of the family of Min and Max induced rankings, are poor predictors of actual
choice behavior. An empirical examination of the axiomatic foundations of these rules
yielded that the only axioms withstanding the test are Simple Top Monotonicity and
Simple Bottom Monotonicity.
Both Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal were violated
on a large scale. People do not seem to be drawn to or repelled by uncertainty in the
way prescribed by these axioms, which is rather restrictive. Since the certain outcome
was the only diﬀerence between both tests, we can assume that it was the change in
relative position of this certain outcome in relation to the outcomes in the binary set
that made people change their preference from one test to the other. These ﬁndings
dovetail with the results of our test of Neutrality in the previous section and imply
that people's preferences over outcomes are not merely ordinal.
The choice patterns demonstrated by the majority of participants also disagreed
with Monotone Consistency and Robustness. By allowing sets to have either their
highest (cf. Monotone Consistency) or their lowest (cf. Robustness) outcomes in
common, we were able to establish a reversal of the rankings of the average set values
which might have caused the participants to violate these axioms' requirements. Still,
in the test of Monotone Consistency, a rather large portion of individuals preferred
{20, 2, 1} over {20, 1}. This pair of sets and its estimated choice proportion closely
resemble the second choice in the test of Top Independence9. In both cases, a sig-
niﬁcant number of participants opted for the three-element set, despite the fact that
its average over the outcomes is much lower than in the binary set. As mentioned,
these unexpected results match the implications of Richness Appeal (Arlegi, 2007)
9This is the choice between {35, 4, 3} and {35, 3}, see section Leximin & Leximax.
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and might be reﬂective of a positive attitude towards a diversiﬁcation of the possible
outcomes within the range bounded by the minimum and maximum of the set.
Lexicographic Minmax & Maxmin
Axioms and Stimuli. The axioms for the characterization of the Lexicographic
Minmax and the Lexicographic Maxmin rules as proposed by Bossert et al. (2000),
as well as the stimuli used to verify them empirically are presented below.
Simple Monotonicity For all x, y ∈ X,
xPy ⇒ {x}  {x, y}  {y}
Simple Monotonicity ensures that, if an outcome x is strictly preferred to an-
other outcome y, then having x with certainty will be preferred to the uncertain
prospect with the two possible outcomes x and y. The latter, in turn, will be preferred
to having y with certainty. Obviously, Simple Monotonicity is fairly unquestionable
in the context of choice under uncertainty. The ﬁrst two rows in Table 9 contain the
pairs of sets that were used to test Simple Monotonicity.
Simple Uncertainty Aversion: For all x, y, z ∈ X,
xPyPz ⇒ {y}  {x, z}.
Simple Uncertainty Appeal: For all x, y, z ∈ X,
xPyPz ⇒ {x, z}  {y}.
These axioms were already explained and tested in the previous section. The
main results for the tests of Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty
Appeal will be recaptured in the discussion
Type 1 Dominance For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X,
[xPaPy for all a ∈ A]⇒ {x, y}  A ∪ {y}.
Type 2 Dominance For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X,
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Table 9: Stimuli used to empirically validate the axioms characterizing Lexicographic Min-
max and Lexicographic Maxmin (Bossert, Pattanaik & Xu, 2000).
Axiom Set
tested
Choice
First (F ) Second(S)
29∗ F1 = {11} S1 = {11, 10}Simple Monotonicity
13 F2 = {11, 10} S2 = {10}
Type 1 Dominance 14 F1 = {29, 3} S1 = {28, 27, 3}
Type 2 Dominance 17 F1 = {20, 3, 2} S1 = {20, 1}
9 F1 = {30} S1 = {50, 17}Type 1 Extension Principle
10∗ F2 = {50, 30, 17} S2 = {50, 17}
5∗ F1 = {40, 15} S1 = {20}Type 2 Extension Principle
6 F2 = {40, 15} S2 = {40, 20, 15}
21∗ F1 = {27} S1 = {35, 19}
Type 1 Monotonicity 22 F2 = {27} S2 = {40, 19}
23∗ F3 = {27} S3 = {40, 35, 19}
9∗ F1 = {50, 17} S1 = {30}
Type 2 Monotonicity 27∗ F2 = {50, 16} S2 = {30}
28 F3 = {50, 17, 16} S3 = {30}
29∗ F1 = {11} S1 = {11, 10}Extension Independence
30 F2 = {13, 11, 3} S2 = {13, 11, 10, 3}
All of these tests were administered in Experiment II
∗ In the ﬁrst replicate, choices marked with an asterisk were presented with set S in the
ﬁrst position, and set F in the second position. In the second replicate, these positions were
reversed. Unmarked choices were arranged in the opposite fashion.
[xPaPy for all a ∈ A]⇒ A ∪ {x}  {x, y}.
Type 1 Dominance ensures that if an outcome x is better than every outcome
in a given set A, and y is worse than every outcome in A, then {x, y} will be preferred
to A ∪ {y}. Analogously, if x and y are strictly better and strictly worse than every
outcome in A, Type 2 Dominance ensures that A ∪ {x} is preferred to {x, y}. These
conditions are stronger versions of Simple Top Monotonicity and Simple Bottom
Monotonicity, which could not be refuted in the previous section. Yet, in contrast to
the latter, Type 1 and Type 2 Dominance must also hold in the case where A ∪ {y}
and A ∪ {x} contain more than two elements. Under those circumstances, however,
it is possible to choose the middle elements in such a way that the average over the
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outcomes in the larger set is either higher or lower than in the binary set. Choices
14 and 17 in Table 9 were used to test Type 1 Dominance and Type 2 Dominance,
respectively. In choice 14, the set average of S1 = {28, 27, 3} is higher than the
average of the two outcomes in F1 = {29, 3}, which might lead people to violate
Type 1 Dominance and choose S1. Similarly, choice 17 assesses Type 2 Dominance,
but here F1 = {20, 3, 2} has the lower average. This might cause people to choose
S1 = {20, 1}, which would be a violation of Type 2 Dominance.
Type 1 Extension Principle For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X\A,
([{a}  {x, y} for all a ∈ A] and [A  {x, y}])⇒ A ∪ {x, y}  {x, y}.
Type 2 Extension Principle For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X\A,
([{x, y}  {a} for all a ∈ A] and [{x, y}  A])⇒ {x, y}  A ∪ {x, y}.
In a decision situation where outcomes x and y are outside of a given set A,
and every distinct element a of A is, when received with certainty, preferred to the
uncertain prospect {x, y}, and A itself is preferred to {x, y} as well, Type 1 Extension
Principle implies that A∪{x, y} will be preferred to {x, y}. Type 2 Extension Principle
is the dual which applies to situations where A, as well as all distinct elements a of A
received with certainty, are ranked as less attractive than {x, y}. In order to reduce the
number of choices needed to test these axioms, we constrained the decision problem
to the simple case where A is a singleton, {a}. In an attempt to produce violations of
Type 1 Extension principle, we used choice stimuli for which the value of a is situated
somewhere in between the values of x and y. The value of a needs to be suﬃciently
high so that not too many subjects prefer {x, y} over a, because such choice patterns
cannot be used to evaluate Type 1 Extension Principle. On the other hand, the value
of a should not be too high, since, in order to obtain violations, we need {x, y} to be
preferred over {x, a, y}. The reverse holds for Type 2 Extension Principle. Several
combinations of values for a, x and y were tested. Those which yielded the most
violations for either axiom are presented as choices 9, 10, 5, and 6 Table 9.
Type 1 Monotonicity For all x ∈ X and all A,B ∈ X,
({x}  A and {x}  B)⇒ {x}  A ∪B.
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Type 2 Monotonicity For all x ∈ X and all A,B ∈ X,
(A  {x} and B  {x})⇒ A ∪B  {x}.
Type 1 Monotonicity requires that if the certainty of having x is preferred to
each of the sets A and B, then receiving x with certainty will also be preferred to the
union of A and B. Type 2 Monotonicity is the dual of Type 1 Monotonicity.
In order to test Type 1 Monotonicity, A and B are both operationalized as
binary sets which have their minimal element in common. That way, taking the
union of both sets will result in a situation where the higher outcomes outweigh the
lower one, as is shown in choices 21, 22, and 23 in Table 9. Suppose that a decision
maker prefers the certain outcome, i.e., F1 and F2, in the ﬁrst two choices. In this
case, Type 1 Monotonicity requires that she will also prefer the certain outcome in the
third choice. However, as S3 = {40, 35, 19} contains two outcomes which are higher
than 27 EUR instead of just one, we might expect some people who safely opted for
the certainty of receiving 27 EUR in choices 21 and 22 to switch to the uncertain
prospect S3 in the third choice.
In order to test Type 2 Monotonicity, A and B are again binary sets, now
sharing their maximum. This results in a less favorable distribution of higher and
lower outcomes if we take the union of both. Considering choices 24, 25, and 26 in
Table 9, someone showing pattern F1F2S3, would be contravening the implications of
Type 2 Monotonicity.
Extension Independence For all A,B ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X\(A ∪B),
[xPzPy for all z ∈ A ∪B]⇒ [A % B ⇔ A ∪ {x, y} % B ∪ {x, y}].
Extension Independence requires that if every alternative in A∪B is worse than
x and better than y, then the relative ranking of A∪{x, y} and B∪{x, y} is the same
as the relative ranking of A and B.
Extension Independence was tested following a similar recipe as for Bottom
Independence (see section Leximin & Leximax). First, as shown in choice 29, par-
ticipants are asked to choose between a singleton, F1 = {11}, and a binary set,
S1 = {11, 10} of which the maximum equals the amount to be won if one chooses the
singleton and the minimum is only slightly lower. Next, both sets are enlarged with
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one outcome which is considerably lower than the original ones and one which is just
a little higher. In choice 30, we end up with two sets with the same minimum of which
S3 = {13, 11, 10, 3} has one more high outcome and thus a higher set average than
F3 = {13, 11, 3}. With these stimuli we attempted to elicit pattern F1S2, a violation
of Extension Independence.
Results. Again, the true and error model (Birnbaum, 2004) was applied. For
each choice, the error rates (e) and the true probability of preferring the second set
(p) were estimated from the data in Table 10.
Table 10: Replication data used to estimate true probability and error rate for each choice.
Set Replication Patterns
Choice
First (F) Second(S) FF FS SF SS
pˆ eˆ χ2(1)
Simple Monotonicity
29 F1 = {11} S1 = {11, 10} 110 8 11 2 0.011 0.080 0.47
13 F2 = {11, 10} S2 = {10} 128 1 1 1 0.008 0.008 0.00
Type 1 Dominance
14 F1 = {29, 3} S1 = {28, 27, 3} 11 11 18 91 0.910 0.130 1.67
Type 2 Dominance
17 F1 = {20, 3, 2} S1 = {20, 1} 83 8 15 25 0.225 0.101 2.09
Type 1 Extension Principle
9 F1 = {30} S1 = {50, 17} 75 16 15 25 0.237 0.137 0.03
10 F2 = {50, 30, 17} S2 = {50, 17} 124 2 4 1 0.007 0.025 0.65
Type 2 Extension Principle
5 F1 = {40, 15} S1 = {20} 102 7 11 11 0.092 0.076 0.88
6 F2 = {40, 15} S2 = {40, 20, 15} 3 9 6 113 0.978 0.062 0.60
Type 1 Monotonicity
21 F1 = {27} S1 = {35, 19} 60 18 16 37 0.373 0.153 0.12
22 F2 = {27} S2 = {40, 19} 49 16 15 51 0.511 0.137 0.03
23 F3 = {27} S3 = {40, 35, 19} 15 9 4 103 0.876 0.056 1.86
Type 2 Monotonicity
24 F1 = {15, 8} S1 = {10} 96 10 13 12 0.102 0.098 0.39
25 F2 = {15, 7} S2 = {10} 90 9 9 23 0.200 0.074 0.00
26 F3 = {15, 8, 7} S3 = {10} 70 18 14 29 0.281 0.143 0.50
Extension Independence
29 F1 = {11} S1 = {11, 10} 110 8 11 2 0.011 0.080 0.47
30 F2 = {13, 11, 3} S2 = {13, 11, 10, 3} 5 14 7 105 0.964 0.092 2.28
Entries under FF , FS, SF , and SS show the observed frequencies of each combination of
choices on the two replicates. The χ2(1)'s in the right-most column evaluate the ﬁt of the
true and error model. All are acceptable ﬁts (α = .05).
Matching the implications of Simple Monotonicity, we found that the great
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majority of participants chose the ﬁrst option in both choices 29 and 13.
As regards choice 14, p = .91 according to the true and error model, indicating
that the preferences of only 9% of the participants conform to Type 1 Dominance. A
diﬀerent result was found for Type 2 Dominance, where as much as 77.5% appears to
comply with the axiom. We did not expect that one of the two counterparts would
be systematically violated while the other is not, since the choice stimuli for both
axioms were constructed following the same reasoning.
Both Type 1 and Type 2 Extension Principle require that the people who choose
set F1 in the ﬁrst choice should also be choosing F2 in the second choice of the
respective tests. This seems to be the case for Type 1 Extension Principle, as almost
everybody is estimated to prefer F2 in choice 10. For Type 2 Extension Principle,
however, the modal choice proportions imply pattern F1S2 for most people. A similar
result is observed for Extension Independence where 98.9% of the participants is
estimated to truly prefer the ﬁrst set in choice 29, while only 3.6% prefers the ﬁrst
set in choice 30.
Type I Monotonicity implies that people who prefer F1 and F2 in choices 21
and 22, should prefer the ﬁrst set in choice 23 as well. However, the estimated choice
proportions suggest otherwise. Indeed, the majority chose F1 in the ﬁrst choice, but
only 48.9% did so in the second choice and merely 12.4% chose the ﬁrst set in the
third choice. For Type 2 Monotonicity, modal choice proportions appear to be in line
with the axiom, but whether the 71.9% who chose the ﬁrst set in choice 26 also chose
the ﬁrst set in the two previous choices is a question that can only be addressed by
analyzing the choice patterns for the sequence of three choices.
Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal, both tested in
the section Minmax & Maxmin, were violated by almost everyone which led us to
conclude that besides ordinal information, also the relative position of elements in and
between sets is taken into account. The eﬀect of the relative position of outcomes is
also nicely illustrated by the results for the ﬁrst two choices of the tests for Type 1 and
Type 2 Monotonicity, i.e., choice pairs 21-22 and 24-25. Only one outcome changes
from the ﬁrst to the second choice in both pairs. In both cases, the percentages
of participants choosing the second set change in the corresponding direction. For
example, in choice 25, the minimum is 1 EUR higher than in the preceding choice
which should elicit a lower preference rate for the second set in choice 25 as compared
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to choice 24. Indeed, Table 10 shows that pˆ increases from 10.2% to 20%.
Further analyses of the demonstrated response patterns for the axiom tests
comprising two choices are presented in Table 11.
Table 11: Estimated true probabilities of each response pattern in the tests of Simple Mono-
tonicity, Type 1 Extension Principle, Type 2 Extension Principle, and Extension Indepen-
dence.
Choice Set Parameter Estimates
First (F ) Second (S) eˆ pˆ(F1F2) pˆ(F1S2) pˆ(S1F2) pˆ(S1S2)
χ2(2)
Simple Monotonicity
29 F1 = {11} S1 = {11, 10} 0.080 0.981 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.19
13 F2 = {11, 10} S2 = {10} 0.008
Type 1 Extension Principle
9 F1 = {30} S1 = {50, 17} 0.142 0.765 0.010 0.226 0.000 0.34
10 F2 = {50, 30, 17} S2 = {50, 17} 0.025
Type 2 Extension Principle
5 F1 = {40, 15} S1 = {20} 0.076 0.026 0.890 0.000 0.085 0.28
6 F2 = {40, 15} S2 = {40, 20, 15} 0.062
Extension Independence
29 F1 = {11} S1 = {11, 10} 0.080 0.042 0.950 0.000 0.014 1.59
30 F2 = {13, 11, 3} S2 = {13, 11, 10, 3} 0.092
Tests of the true and error model are shown in the last column. All ﬁve of them show
acceptable ﬁts (α = .05). Entries in bold are the probabilities of the true patterns that
comply with the axiom on that line.
The ﬁrst row shows that the estimated probability of having F1F2 as the true
preference pattern for choices 29 and 13, as prescribed by Simple Monotonicity, equals
98.1%.
Not all response patterns are eligible for the evaluation of both types of Ex-
tension Principle. Only those with a true preference for F1 in the ﬁrst choice of the
respective testsi.e., F1F2 and F1S2can be considered, which adds up to a total of
77.5% (pˆ(F1F2)+ pˆ(F1S2)) of all responses for Type 1 Extension Principle and 91.6%
for Type 2 Extension Principle. Considering Type 1 Extension Principle, 98.7%
(0.765/0.775) of all participants who had a true preference for F1 in choice 9, also
chose F2 in choice 10, thus complying with the axiom. Conversely, 91.6% (0.89/0.971)
of the respondents choosing F1 in the test for Type 2 Extension Principle violated
the axiom by choosing S2 in choice 6.
Considering the last two choices in Table 11, patterns F1F2 and S1S2 are
consistent with Extension Independence. However, it is estimated that 95% of all
participants truly switched from F1 in Choice 29 to S2 in Choice 30, hereby violating
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Extension Independence.
Table 12 shows the analysis of the response patterns for the sequence of three
choices in the test of Type 1 Monotonicity. For this analysis, we used the extended
true and error model described in the section Comparison of Min and Max induced
rankings and UEU. By taking into account the complete sequence, we were able
to determine whether the participants choosing F1 and F2 in the ﬁrst two choices
also opted for F3 in the third choice, as prescribed by Type 1 Monotonicity. Of the
131 participants, 50.5% is estimated to have a true preference for the ﬁrst set in
choices 21 and 22 (pˆ(F1F2F3) + pˆ(F1F2S3))). The great majority thereof, i.e., 71.9%
(0.363/0.505), appears to be violating the axiom by demonstrating pattern F1F2S3.
Table 12: Observed frequencies and estimated true probabilities for each of the 8 possible
response patterns in the test of Type 1 Monotonicity. Choices 21, 22, and 23 in Experiment
II. χ2(5) = 8.81
Response Observed frequencies Estimated true
pattern Rep 1 Rep 2 Both One not both probability
F1F2F3 18 16 11 6 0.142
F1F2S3 40 37 21 17.5 0.363
F1S2F3 1 2 1 0.5 0.008
F1S2S3 19 21 5 15 0.061
S1F2F3 2 0 0 1 0.000
S1F2S3 5 11 1 7 0.000
S1S2F3 3 1 0 2 0.000
S1S2S3 43 43 30 13 0.425
Total 131 131 69 62 1.000
Entries under  Rep 1, Rep 2 and Both represent the number of participants who
showed each pattern for the ﬁrst presentation of these three choices (the ﬁrst replicate),
the second presentation (the second replicate), and both presentations, respectively. The
column labeled One not both contains the number of people who showed that pattern on
one of the two replicates but not both. The sum of the frequencies in the One not both and
Both columns adds to the total number of participants so none of the response patterns is
counted twice. Estimated error rates are 0.041, 0.107, and 0.176 for Choices 21, 22, and 23,
respectively. Evaluation of the true and error model yields χ2(5) = 4.52, an acceptable ﬁt.
The extended true and error model was also ﬁt to the frequencies in Table
13. Here, a diﬀerent pattern prevails. The percentage of participants that can
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be taken into account for the examination of Type 2 Monotonicity equals 79.6%
(pˆ(F1F2F3) + pˆ(F1F2S3))). The true preferences of 86.8% (0.691/0.796) of the people
who chose the ﬁrst set in the ﬁrst two choices of the test agree with the axiom as they
preferred the ﬁrst set in the third choice as well, hence demonstrating pattern F1F2F3.
Merely 13.2% (0.105/0.796) are estimated to be violating Type 2 Monotonicity by
demonstrating pattern F1F2S3.
Table 13: Observed frequencies and estimated true probabilities for each of the 8 possible
response patterns in the test of Type 2 Monotonicity. choices 24, 25, and 26 in Experiment
II. χ2(5) = 9.66
Response Observed frequencies Estimated true
pattern Rep 1 Rep 2 Both One not both probability
F1F2F3 70 71 55 15.5 0.691
F1F2S3 22 22 9 13 0.105
F1S2F3 12 8 3 7 0.036
F1S2S3 2 8 1 4 0.013
S1F2F3 3 3 0 3 0.000
S1F2S3 4 3 0 3.5 0.000
S1S2F3 3 2 1 1.5 0.009
S1S2S3 15 14 7 7.5 0.145
Total 131 131 76 55 1.000
Discussion. It has been demonstrated that Lexicographic Minmax and Maxmin
do not perform well at all in predicting choices between sets of possible monetary
outcomes. In order to get a better understanding of why these models fail to accom-
modate the preferences of real-life decision makers, the axioms characterizing these
models, as proposed by Bossert et al. (2000), were tested one by one.
Simple Monotonicity had the lowest violation rate, almost everybody's choices
complied with this axiom.
As demonstrated in the section Minmax & Maxmin, Simple Uncertainty Aver-
sion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal were both systematically violated, indicating that
the strength of preference between outcomes is taken into consideration when making
a decision.
Choice patterns for the vast majority of participants also disagreed with Ex-
tension Independence and Type 1 Dominance. For constructing the stimuli in these
tests, we started once again from the assumption that people rank sets according to
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the average over their outcomes. This seems to have worked ﬁne for Extension Inde-
pendence as well as for Type 1 Dominance. However, in the test of Type 2 Dominance
a much smaller (but not insigniﬁcant) portion of the participants demonstrated a vi-
olating choice pattern. An inconsistency arises that bears some resemblance with the
ones observed in the tests of Bottom Independence, Top Independence and Monotone
Consistency, namely, that it appears to be easier to provoke violations when the set
with the highest average also has the highest number of elements than when this is
not the case.
In the construction of the stimuli for the tests of Type 1 and 2 Extension
Principle and Type 1 and 2 Monotonicity, two important diﬃculties arose. First,
it was not possible to use stimuli that would evoke violations if people consistently
choose the set with the highest average. In fact, in the tests of Type 1 and Type 2
Extension Principle, no speciﬁc strategy was followed in order to provoke violations;
we just used a binary set and a singleton with an outcome situated somewhere in the
middle between the ones in the binary set. Consequently, it rather came as a surprise
that an extremely large portion of participants violated Type 2 Extension Principle.
However, for Type 1 Extension Principle, violations were virtually nonexistent. Again,
it is shown that, when confronted with the choice between a binary set and a set
with the same elements enlarged with some extra outcome in the middle, people are
inclined to choose the larger set, which perfectly ﬁts the implications of the Richness
Appeal axiom. In order to challenge Type 1 and Type 2 Monotonicity, the proportion
of outcomes higher/lower than the certain outcome was manipulated in the uncertain
prospect. This yielded a high violation rate for Type 1 Monotonicity, while the
violation rate for Type 2 Monotonicity was rather low. A second diﬃculty in testing
these four axioms is that for the choice patterns to be eligible for the evaluation of the
axiom, one or two conditional preferences which were not so obvious to elicit had to
be stated. Conversely, the other axiom tests in this paper consisting of more than one
choice lend themselves to evaluation with stimulus pairs where the desired response
in the conditional choice(s) would occur if people choose according to Simple Top
or Bottom Monotonicity or Dominance, which was as good as always the case.
Notwithstanding these impediments, we were able to bring about substantial
violation rates for one of the two counterparts in both axiom pairs. Knowing that
any couple of two dual axioms is supposed to represent the same property, albeit in
diﬀerent directions, we are inclined to believe that the actual properties represented
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by these axioms do not hold in general and that it is a rather unfortunate choice of
stimuli which is responsible for the lack of violations of Type 1 Extension Principle
and Type 2 Monotonicity.
Summary and General Discussion
This paper presents an extensive experimental investigation of some decision
rules for the ranking of sets of uncertain outcomes: Maximax, Maximin, Minmax,
Maxmin and their lexicographic extensions Leximin, Leximax, Lexicographic Min-
max, and Lexicographic Maxmin. These rules, which were grouped under the um-
brella term Min and Max induced rankings, have in common that they require
preferences over sets to be induced from the comparison of the best and/or worst
elements in those sets. The lexicographic extensions also permit the induction of
preferences from comparisons of the second, third, or fourth best and/or worst ele-
ments if the previous ones coincide. Furthermore, Min and Max induced rankings
imply that only ordinal information about the outcomes is taken into account by the
decision maker.
This family of models stands in sharp contrast with the Uniform Expected
Utility criterion (UEU) according to which preferences are not induced from the
comparison of certain elements, but sets are ranked on the basis of the arithmetic
average of the utilities of all their elements. By assuming a utility function, one
allows that the strength of preference over the elements plays a role in establishing a
set ranking.
In the ﬁrst experimental section of this paper, it was shown that the Min and
Max induced rankings perform particularly worse than UEU in predicting real-life
decision makers' preferences over sets of monetary outcomes. When presented with
a binary set and a three-element set with a higher average over the elements but a
lower minimum and maximum than the binary set, the grand majority chose the set
with the better average, contrary to the implications of the Min and Max induced
rankings.
Notwithstanding the fact that these rankings were rather easily rejected, we
decided to further investigate their axiomatic underpinnings. Finding out which
axioms hold, which do not, and whether we can we group them in some way according
to certain characteristics might facilitate the development of models that are more
accurate in the descriptive sense. In fact, analysis of the axioms characterizing
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Min and Max induced rankings yielded four large categories: Dominance and
Monotonicity conditions, axioms ensuring that only ordinal information is used,
axioms that prevent rankings to be based on average-goodness, and a rest category
with four axioms.
Very few violations were observed for Dominance and its weaker version Simple
Monotonicity. Both these axioms rule out rankings of sets that are based ontotal-
goodness criteria (Pattanaik & Peleg, 1984). Dominance, for example, implies that
enlarging a set with an element which is worse than all the original elements will de-
crease the attractiveness of that set, although enlarging a set would always increase
its total worth. Since as good as every participant's choices complied with Domi-
nance as well as Simple Monotonicity, we can conclude that in the current context,
where sets represent uncertain prospects for which only one outcome can materialize,
people do not evaluate sets by their total goodness.
We were unable to provoke even the slightest true" violation of Simple Top
Monotonicity and Simple Bottom Monotonicity. Both these monotonicity conditions
ensure that replacing one set element with a better one yields a better set. Like
Dominance and Simple Monotonicity, these axioms seem fairly unquestionable, which
was conﬁrmed by the results.
We tested three axioms that ensure that only ordinal information about the
outcomes is considered by the decision makers: Neutrality, Simple Uncertainty
Appeal, and Simple Uncertainty Aversion. All three of them could be refuted on
a large scale. Although the Min and Max induced rankings are convenient for
constructing rankings over sets from nothing more but the ordinal data of people's
rankings over outcomes, we clearly demonstrated that the relative diﬀerences in the
positions of monetary outcomes have a substantial eﬀect on stated preferences. It
is suspected that this ﬁnding also applies to other types of outcomes. For example,
in the case of election candidates the decision maker does not only prefer some
candidate X over another candidate Y , but, in many cases she also prefers X to
some extent over Y . Thus, if one's goal is to develop a descriptively plausible
model for the ranking of sets of possible outcomes, the strength of preference over
set elements should be incorporated in that model.
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Several axioms in the characterizations of Min and Max induced rankings
prevent preferences to be based on average-goodness considerations as implied by
UEU, i.e., calculating the arithmetic average of the utilities of the outcomes10. In
order to test these axioms, stimuli were constructed in such a way that the axiom
in question is violated if the subjects consistently choose the set with the higher
average over the outcomes. This method yielded major violationsviolation rates
ranging from 52% to 89%for all but one of the axioms in this group. For unknown
reasons, the test of Type 2 Dominance produced only 22.5% violations. Although
non-negligible, this violation rate is substantially lower than those resulting from
the tests of the other axioms in this group. Possibly, a stronger refutation of Type
2 Dominance would be established if choices were administered with an even larger
diﬀerence in the averages of the sets to be compared.
More diﬃcult to interpret are the results for the remaining four axioms: Type
1 and Type 2 Extension Principle, and Type 1 and Type 2 Monotonicity. In these
cases, it was not possible to construct stimuli in such a way that consistently choosing
the set with the higher average would result in violations. Instead, in the test of
Type 1 and Type 2 Monotonicity, we attempted to elicit violations by creating a shift
in the proportions of high versus low outcomes, which seems to have worked well for
one of the two counterparts, but not for the other. With regard to the Extension
Principle axioms, no speciﬁc strategy was followed besides not allowing the average
over the outcomes in the sets to be compared to diﬀer too much. Nonetheless,
just about everybody violated the Type 1 variant, while almost no violations were
observed for the Type 2 variant. What is more, is that the subjects needed to
state some less evident preferences in the ﬁrst choices of each test in order for their
preference patterns to be eligible for the evaluation of these axioms. Nevertheless,
under these circumstances, violation rates were in both cases very high for one of
the two counterparts. Since any couple of dual axioms is intended to represent
the same underlying property in opposing directions, it is suspected that the
underlying properties do not hold and that the lower violation rates for Type 1 Ex-
tension Principle and Type 2 Monotonicity are mainly due to a poor choice of stimuli.
10Axioms that prevent rankings to be based on average-goodness are: Bottom Independence, Top
Independence, Disjoint Independence, Monotone Consistency, Robustness, Type 1 Dominance, Type
2 Dominance, and Extension Independence.
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Experimental research in the domain of set ranking has hitherto given us some
hints as to what requirements should be met by rankings that are intended to model
actual choice behavior for a signiﬁcant portion of people. First of all, we suspect that
such a ranking has to be transitive (Vrijdags, 2010). Furthermore, it should meet the
requirements of Dominance, Simple Top and Simple Bottom Monotonicity. It must
also take into account the strength of preference between outcomes, and it should not
prevent sets to be evaluated according to their average-goodness.
The UEU criterion appears to satisfy every single one of these requirements,
yet some observations were made that cast serious doubt on the validity of UEU as
a descriptive model.
Table 14: Choices for which a signiﬁcant portion of the estimated true preferences seem to
conﬂict with UEU
Set
Choice Experiment
First Second
pˆ eˆ χ2(1)
22 I F = {35, 4, 3} S = {35, 3} 0.536 0.227 1.39
39 I F = {20, 2, 1} S = {20, 1} 0.621 0.116 1.77
17 II F = {20, 3, 2} S = {20, 1} 0.225 0.101 2.09
Entries under pˆ show the true probability of preferring the second set (S) in each choice,
estimated with the true and error model. The error rates for these choices are listed under
eˆ. The χ2(1)'s in the right-most column evaluate the ﬁt of the true and error model, which
is acceptable in all three cases (α = .05).
In all three choices in Table 14, a substantial number of people truly preferred
set F , the set with the lowest average. Such preferences are hard to explain with
UEU, unless an extremely risk averse utility function is assumed for all subjects
choosing the ﬁrst set, which seems rather implausible. One way to avoid having to
estimate utility functions is by verifying whether these people's preferences satisfy
the behavioral axioms characterizing UEU. Therefore, an experimental study of these
axioms will be the focus of our future research. This way, we hope to determine to
what extent UEU applies.
A possible explanation for the results in Table 14 might be found along the
lines of Arlegi's Richness Appeal axiom. (Arlegi, 2007) which states that any set
of three outcomes is always considered better than the binary set containing only
the minimum and maximum. Richness Appeal does not strictly apply to Choice 17,
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since these sets do not share their minimum. However, some stronger version of the
axiom can be thought of that explains a preference for the three element set in this
choice as well. The main underlying idea would be that some people appear to be
drawn to a diversiﬁcation of uncertainty in the form of larger sets, as long as this
diversiﬁcation does not go below the worst possible outcome. This unanticipated,
yet interesting phenomenon appears to be fairly robust, similar choices in other tests
reported in this paper endorse it, as well as the unreported data11. Considering the
results for the test of Dominance, we can assume that this inclination towards larger
sets is not the result of mistakenly evaluating sets by their total goodness.
In conclusion, the Min and Max induced rankings do a pretty bad job; they
are clearly and easily rejected. Their main virtue is that their use does not require
the elicitation of any parameter which is probably why they have been so popular in
the literature, despite their low plausibility. In this paper, a descriptive attitude was
adopted, a quite diﬀerent perspective. For the modeling of observed set rankings,
UEU seems to be a far more valuable candidate. However, for a considerable group
of people we suspect that they do not use UEU, neither any of the Min and Max
induced rankings investigated in this paper, but some other decision rule which might
be characterized by a preference for a particular diversiﬁcation of uncertainty.
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Table 15: Raw data for all choices in Experiment I and Experiment II.
Set Patterns Set Patterns
No.
First Second FF FS SF
No.
First Second FF FS SF
Experiment I 42 {35, 10, 5} {35, 10, 3} 96 4 1
1 {23, 20} {20} 79 14 2 43 {35, 10, 5, 3} {35, 10, 3} 36 11 12
3 {28, 17} {28, 17, 13} 83 6 8 44 {29, 3} {28, 3} 101 0 0
4 {29, 3} {28, 27, 2} 12 12 17 45 {29, 3} {27, 3} 100 1 0
5 {37, 35, 27, 7, 2} {35, 27, 7, 2} 91 4 3 46 {29, 3} {28, 27, 3} 8 7 16
7 {20} {24, 7} 86 6 4 47 {59, 5, 1} {56, 5, 1} 101 0 0
8 {20} {24, 20, 7} 71 5 13 48 {59, 5, 1} {55, 5, 1} 100 0 1
9 {24, 20, 7} {24, 7} 90 3 4 49 {59, 5, 1} {56, 55, 5, 1} 4 5 9
10 {37, 9, 7} {19} 19 10 13 50 {99, 13, 10} {95, 12, 10} 98 1 1
11 {37, 9, 7} {37, 19, 9, 7} 2 3 11 51 {99, 13, 10} {97, 11, 10} 95 4 1
12 {37, 19, 9, 7} {19} 25 12 16 52 {99, 13, 10}{97, 95, 12, 11, 10} 12 12 17
13 {6, 5} {7, 1} 90 4 4 Experiment II
14 {6, 5} {7, 6, 5, 1} 71 15 9 1 {11} {15, 10} 2 6 12
15 {7, 6, 5, 1} {7, 1} 90 4 3 2 {15, 11, 10} {15, 10} 72 9 31
16 {70, 20, 10} {30, 25} 29 19 7 3 {2} {7, 0} 22 18 13
17 {70, 20, 10}{70, 30, 25, 20, 10} 5 6 14 4 {7, 2, 0} {7, 0} 78 20 15
18 {70, 30, 25, 20, 10} {30, 25} 42 27 5 5 {20} {40, 15} 11 11 7
16' {94, 12} {45, 43, 32} 18 15 9 6 {40, 20, 15} {40, 15} 113 9 6
17' {94, 12}{94, 45, 43, 32, 12} 4 11 8 7 {19, 9} {14} 49 25 17
18' {94, 45, 43, 32, 12} {45, 43, 32} 52 16 10 8 {19, 9} {19, 14, 9} 3 4 2
19 {20} {20, 18} 85 8 6 9 {50, 17} {30} 25 15 16
20 {20, 1} {20, 18, 1} 1 2 4 10 {50, 17} {50, 30, 17} 1 4 2
21 {4, 3} {3} 99 1 1 11 {10, 4} {7} 35 9 13
22 {35, 4, 3} {35, 3} 31 14 21 12 {10, 4} {10, 7, 4} 3 9 4
23 {20, 19, 18} {20, 19, 18, 16} 83 8 4 13 {11, 10} {10} 128 1 1
24 {20, 19, 18, 2} {20, 19, 18, 16, 2} 10 16 15 14 {29, 3} {28, 27, 3} 11 11 18
25 {25, 20} {21} 78 13 5 15 {24} {25, 15} 106 11 7
26 {80, 75, 25, 20} {80, 75, 21} 38 20 21 16 {25, 15} {16} 117 7 2
27 {62, 60} {62, 59, 58} 83 8 6 17 {20, 1} {20, 3, 2} 25 15 8
28 {62, 60, 7, 2} {62, 59, 58, 7, 2} 6 9 8 18 {10} {13, 7} 51 25 16
29 {100} {95, 90} 94 3 4 19 {10} {14, 7} 34 15 13
30 {100, 10} {95, 90, 10} 6 4 8 20 {10} {14, 13, 7} 8 14 3
31 {5, 3} {2} 96 3 2 21 {27} {35, 19} 60 18 16
32 {50, 45, 5, 3} {50, 45, 2} 40 10 11 22 {27} {40, 19} 49 16 15
33 {40, 1} {11, 10} 43 17 11 23 {27} {40, 35, 19} 15 9 4
34 {40, 37, 25, 22, 1}{37, 25, 22, 11, 10} 20 14 21 24 {15, 8} {10} 96 10 13
35 {67, 49, 45} {70, 50, 2} 89 8 2 25 {15, 7} {10} 90 9 9
36 {67, 49, 45, 5, 1} {70, 50, 5, 2, 1} 74 13 5 26 {15, 8, 7} {10} 70 18 14
35' {100, 9} {29, 27} 45 15 11 27 {50, 16} {30} 25 15 6
36' {100, 94, 93, 92, 9}{94, 93, 92, 29, 27} 19 22 15 28 {50, 17, 16} {30} 15 10 8
37 {15, 10, 9, 1} {15, 9, 7, 1} 97 3 1 29 {11} {11, 10} 110 8 11
38 {20, 2} {20, 1} 101 0 0 30 {13, 11, 3} {13, 11, 10, 3} 5 14 7
39 {20, 2, 1} {20, 1} 31 7 13 31 {28, 17} {28, 17, 13} 111 11 6
40 {55, 10, 8} {55, 9, 6} 98 2 1 32 {37, 28, 17} {28, 17} 125 1 4
41 {55, 10, 9, 8, 6} {55, 9, 6} 42 12 16 33 {25} {18, 2} 128 2 1
Entries under FF , FS, and SF show the observed frequencies of each combination of
choices on the two replicates. Frequencies for SS are not given since they can be derived
as follows: SS = n − (FF + FS + SF ) with n = 101 for Experiment I and n = 131 for
Experiment II.
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